America’s Enemies Are Watching Our Infrastructure Fail
For thousands of Americans, Friday’s nationwide FAA ground stop offered an unsettling lesson in how quickly the systems we depend upon can fail. It was only the second nationwide ground stop since 9/11. Flights were canceled, connections missed, and travelers stranded far from home. I watched the disruption unfold at Wyoming’s Jackson Hole Airport, where passengers sat aboard aircraft, returned to the terminal, and waited for answers. Eventually everyone gave up and headed home or searched for a hotel.
The FAA lifted the November 13 ground stop Friday evening, but the disruption continued as airlines struggled to reposition aircraft and crews. By Saturday morning, they had canceled more than 3,000 additional flights. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy attributed the failure to overloaded switches and routers in the FAA’s aging telecommunications network. Older equipment failed, he said, while newer equipment held up. Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin said investigators had found no evidence of a cyberattack, although their examination was continuing. That is reassuring, but it hardly settles the larger problem.
Americans have grown accustomed to assuming that the lights will come on, clean water will flow, phones will work, and airplanes will fly. Friday exposed how quickly one of those assumptions can collapse. What happens when several fail together?
That question goes to the heart of national security. Our adversaries are watching, and some have already penetrated systems upon which our daily lives and military strength depend.
Washington Has Been Warned
The Government Accountability Office reported in 2024 that 51 of the FAA’s 138 air traffic control systems were unsustainable and another 54 potentially unsustainable. In September, GAO warned that the FAA’s ambitious new modernization effort lacked a reliable life-cycle cost estimate and an integrated master schedule. Friday showed the cost of keeping aging infrastructure in service too long, and Mullin said new equipment appeared to have overwhelmed the old. Modernization is essential, but it must proceed with rigorous testing, reliable backups, and careful integration of old and new systems.
Aviation is hardly alone. Thousands of water utilities depend on industrial controllers to operate pumps, valves, and treatment equipment. In 2023, federal agencies reported that hackers affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had compromised controllers at American water facilities, exploiting internet-exposed devices still protected by default passwords. In April, during the conflict with Iran, another federal advisory warned that Iranian-affiliated hackers were exploiting industrial controllers across U.S. water, energy, and government systems.
The electric grid faces the same strain, with aging equipment tied to digital controls and remote connections. When electricity fails, water treatment, hospitals, communications, fuel distribution, and military installations suffer with it. Each system leans on the others, and together they form the foundation of modern American life.
The Chinese Threat Is Already Documented
In February 2024, the FBI, National Security Agency, and CISA warned that Chinese state-sponsored hackers known as Volt Typhoon had compromised American communications, energy, transportation, and water infrastructure. The agencies assessed that Beijing was pre-positioning to disrupt essential services in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States, and that some intrusions had gone undetected for at least five years.
Taiwan is the obvious scenario. In a confrontation over that island, Beijing would have every incentive to delay American deployments and complicate our logistics. Disrupted power, transportation, or communications at home could impede a military response thousands of miles away. An adversary need not strike a base to affect the forces operating from it.
There is no evidence that Chinese or Iranian hackers caused Friday’s FAA failure. But an accidental failure can expose weaknesses that an adversary might exploit. Foreign intelligence services will study which services failed, how authorities responded, and how long recovery took, then fold the lessons into war plans.
National Defense Begins at Home
As an Army infantry officer, I learned that soldiers cannot fight on weapons and courage alone. They need fuel, reliable communications, transportation, and supplies. The Pentagon depends heavily on civilian networks and utilities, and on commercial carriers that can supplement military airlift through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. Friday’s grounding of those same carriers should give defense planners pause.
That helps explain the Pentagon’s reported FORTRESS initiative, which calls for major domestic installations to sustain essential operations for 90 days without outside electricity, water, fuel, or supplies. The standard applies to bases, not American households, but it raises a question every family should ask: What happens when the essential services we take for granted disappear?
Federal emergency guidance recommends keeping several days of water, food, medicines, and basic supplies. A flashlight, battery-powered radio, and a plan to check on neighbors are ordinary precautions, the kind our grandparents took for granted. Churches and neighborhoods that prepare together can care for those who cannot prepare on their own.
What Washington Must Do
Washington must do more than investigate Friday’s outage and move on. The FAA and its contractors should explain what failed, why existing safeguards could not prevent a nationwide ground stop, and how corrective measures will be tested. Duffy is seeking additional modernization funding. Congress should demand a credible schedule, independent oversight, and measurable improvements in reliability before committing taxpayers to another costly undertaking.
Federal agencies, state governments, and private operators must identify common points of failure across the electric grid, water systems, transportation, and telecommunications. Backup capabilities should be genuinely independent, not simply another connection to the same vulnerable network. Regular exercises should test whether essential services can continue during prolonged outages.
Cybersecurity is indispensable, but so are maintenance, replacement parts, trained personnel, and the ability to operate safely when digital systems fail.
Defense planners must also test scenarios involving simultaneous interruptions to electricity, transportation, water, and communications. Military readiness cannot be separated from the resilience of the country that sustains our armed forces.
Scripture warns, “The prudent sees danger and hides himself, but the simple go on and suffer for it” (Proverbs 22:3, ESV). The prudent man prepares. The simple man assumes tomorrow will look like today.
Friday’s nationwide ground stop appears to have resulted from a technical failure rather than an enemy attack. That should trouble us, because no foreign adversary was needed to disrupt air travel across the country. Imagine the consequences if a determined enemy targeted several essential services at once.
Our enemies are watching. Washington had better be paying attention.


