Western "imperialism" has been a favorite literary subgenre for leftist Latin American sociologists and historians for decades. The white man placing his boot upon the "noble savage" - Spaniards, Portuguese, British; no one is spared in the scholars' indignant pages.

Yet, these days, Chinese “imperialism” — bringing yuan in one hand and extraterritorial “tentacle decrees” for the region in the other — rarely makes the headlines.

China has advanced via the New Silk Road initiative, utilizing loans and projects involving ports, mineral extraction, technology, and multi-million-dollar investments across the Global South. However, according to economic analyst Carlos Palacios, the country now also seeks to extend its laws beyond its borders, bringing its companies, institutions, and citizens operating in other countries under Beijing’s shadow.

Now, in the face of multiple U.S. sanctions, China aims to ensure that wherever Chinese interests exist, the Xi Jinping regime retains the power to exert pressure and make decisions — even when those activities take place on foreign soil, the expert warned.

Of particular concern are the regulations known as the “Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures” (Decree 835) and the “Rules on the Security of Industrial and Supply Chains” (Decree 834).

Under both frameworks, Beijing will be able to assess whether a legal, administrative, regulatory, or judicial measure issued by another country affects its sovereignty, security, development interests, or the rights of its companies and citizens, Palacios explained. And, “if it reaches that conclusion, Chinese organizations could be barred from complying with or cooperating with that foreign measure, unless the Chinese state itself authorizes it.”

The prestigious law firm Morgan Lewis, which advises multinational companies on corporate law, stated that Decrees 835 and 834 — which took effect immediately upon publication early in the year — did not introduce novel legal concepts. Rather, they systematize, elevate, and expand a set of tools designed to counter Western sanctions — tools developed since 2020 — by integrating elements of the Unreliable Entity List and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law.

“China has shifted from applying ‘ad hoc’ countermeasures to possessing a comprehensive, interagency legal framework for counter-sanctions,” Morgan Lewis noted, “capable of addressing business conduct, regulatory compliance decisions, and cross-border legal disputes.”

For instance, a corporate action — such as terminating a contract with a supplier to comply with U.S. export controls — could simultaneously trigger supply chain investigations (Decree 834), countermeasures based on extraterritorial jurisdiction (Decree 835), or inclusion on China’s Unreliable Entity List.

Companies doing business with the Asian giant that attempt to align themselves with Washington will now face counter-sanctions from the Communist Party. This could jeopardize access to China’s lucrative raw materials and consumer markets.

Regarding jurisdiction, the Communist Party is also overstepping its bounds. According to Morgan Lewis, Decree 835 can be interpreted “as an articulation of China’s stance on exercising jurisdiction over conduct that bears an ‘appropriate connection’ to the country, thereby increasing the risk associated with decisions made outside its territory.”

“Within this systematized framework, the most immediate risk arises where routine business decisions directly intersect with overseas compliance obligations,” the firm concluded.

Several Latin American countries are affected by the penetration of Chinese capital; Nicaragua is one of them. Peru is another case in point; it is a country from which China sources a significant portion of its minerals and where it holds investments of high strategic importance, such as the Chancay deep-water port.

“What would happen if a Peruvian regulator demanded information, imposed a sanction, required cooperation, or mandated an obligation upon a Chinese company, and Beijing ordered it not to comply?” Palacios asked in an article. “The answer would define the true extent of Peruvian state sovereignty.”

Neither Peru nor any other country — I would add — can afford to be naive. China is a major trading partner, “but that economic importance cannot become a license to operate by its own rules.”

Moreover, if Chinese extraterritorial laws were to affect the relationship between nations in the Hemisphere and their national security, the White House would not tolerate it — at least not from the perspective of the Monroe Doctrine. Especially not when Chinese “imperialism” brings nothing but death.