Combined casualties from the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war could reach the grim milestone of two million this spring as the fourth year of war nears completion, according to an analysis published Tuesday by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The CSIS report estimates that Russian forces have lost 1.2 million men (killed, wounded, or missing) to Ukraine’s 500,000 to 600,000, putting the total combined casualties as high as 1.8 million. Yet Russia has very little to show for all this carnage, which merely provides another object lesson to show that war is horrible and should not be entered into lightly.

The number killed in battle was roughly a quarter of the total fatalities. CSIS placed battlefield fatalities at 275,000 to 325,000 for Russia and 100,000 to 140,000 for Ukraine.

But those are still astonishing numbers when compared to other conflicts. “Russian battlefield fatalities in Ukraine are more than 17 times greater than Soviet fatalities in Afghanistan during the 1980s, 11 times greater than during Russia’s First and Second Chechen Wars in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively, and over five times greater than all Russian and Soviet wars combined since World War II,” noted the CSIS report.

To put the numbers in an American context, the U.S. suffered “54,487 battle deaths during the Korean War, 47,434 deaths during the Vietnam War, 149 deaths during the 1990–1991 Gulf War, 2,465 deaths in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, and 4,432 deaths in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Ukraine has already suffered more than twice the battlefield deaths as the U.S. in the Vietnam War, while Russia has suffered the losses of six Vietnam Wars.

Despite all this bloodshed, Russian President Vladimir Putin is hardly closer to advancing his war aims than when he started. “Putin’s primary objective is to bring Ukraine back into Russia’s sphere of influence,” CSIS described, “either directly by militarily conquering and annexing Ukraine (as Russia has done in some areas of eastern Ukraine) or indirectly by installing a Russian ally in Kyiv. In addition, Putin seeks to prevent further NATO expansion eastward, either through NATO membership or an expanding U.S. or European sphere of influence.”

If anything, these war aims have backfired, as Ukrainians have developed a more robust national identity and European nations have increased their security commitments to Volodymyr Zelensky’s nation.

In fact, despite holding the battlefield initiative and air superiority for nearly two years, Russian forces have found only the flimsiest gains. Russia seized 45,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory (8% of the total) in 2014 and another 75,000 square kilometers since 2022 (12% of the total), for a total land gain approximately the size of Pennsylvania, according to CSIS. But it has only gained 8,900 square kilometers since the beginning of 2024 (1.5% of the total), an area slightly larger than Delaware.

To further illustrate this point, CSIS assessed individual Russian advances. After Russia captured Avdiivka, an important hub in the eastern Donetsk province in February 2024, Russian forces began advancing from there towards two other cities — Pokrovsk (50 kilometers/31 miles away) and Chasiv Yar (10 kilometers/6 miles away). Yet Russia’s hard-fought advance was so slow that Ukrainian fighters still held pockets of resistance in both cities in early January 2026.

After crunching the numbers, CSIS determined that Russia’s advance toward Pokrovsk averaged 70 meters per day (a meter is slightly longer than a yard), and its advance toward Chasiv Yar averaged 15 meters per day. Not every Russian advance was this slow (a recent push in Zaporizhzhia province averaged 297 meters per day), but this is historically slow. The infamous Battle of the Somme (WWI) compares favorably, when the British and French advanced 80 meters per day, and the Soviet advance in the Battle of Leningrad (WWII) was a whopping 1,000 meters per day.

National Review’s Jim Geraghty pointed out that snails have been clocked at a rate that works out to 25 meters per day, meaning that the Russian army is advancing in Ukraine at a literal snail’s pace.

Russia is hoping to exhaust Ukraine through a war of attrition, engaging in “a series of set-piece battles through piecemeal destruction of its military, including matériel and personnel,” CSIS observed. The problem for Russia is that attrition wears on its own forces too, especially as Russia suffers between four and five casualties for every two Ukrainian casualties. (One reason for this is Russian tactics, which involve sending ill-trained foot soldiers out into the open to draw Ukrainian fire.)

Russia’s war of attrition is having some effect, as Ukraine is now enlisting all but the worst prisoners for its war effort. However, Russia already emptied its own prisons earlier in the war.

Russia’s long war has also hurt its economy, which has seen growth slow, manufacturing decline, and inflation remain high, CSIS said. Russia is financing the war through higher taxes and domestic borrowing, which only drives down domestic demand while producing nothing of benefit to the economy in return. “Tank factories are working overtime, but automobile producers have cut shifts,” CSIS reported. Russia is also falling behind on technological development, with no companies in the world’s top 100 tech companies.

All this is without mentioning the suffering inflicted on civilians. Russia has consistently attacked Ukraine’s power grid, cutting off power to a million Ukrainians as temperatures are expected to drop to minus 22 degrees Fahrenheit. Americans who remember the shortages of World War II can likely recall what deprivations must be felt even by civilians living in the larger, stronger power.

In the late 1960s, anti-war activists wrote the song, “War, What Is It Good for?” in response to just a fraction of the human suffering that has resulted from Russia’s war against Ukraine. And while it oversold the case, it highlighted the fact that wars always result in suffering. Christians should deplore this suffering because it degrades the dignity of people made in God’s image, and we should alleviate such suffering when we can.

This is not a pacifist argument. The reality that wars are horrible does not require the conclusion that all wars must be avoided at all costs. Jesus warned his disciples that “wars and rumors of wars … must take place” before the end (Matthew 24:6). Rather, it is a warning against pointless wars, senseless wars, or pointlessly prolonged wars. If there must be war, there had better be a reason great enough to justify the lives lost, the innocents harmed, and the famine spread.

Sensible leaders will “count the cost” before going to war, or before continuing a war that has lost its purpose. This is so obvious that Jesus used it as an object lesson to introduce the cost of discipleship in his kingdom, “Or what king, going out to encounter another king in war, will not sit down first and deliberate whether he is able with ten thousand to meet him who comes against him with twenty thousand? And if not, while the other is yet a great way off, he sends a delegation and asks for terms of peace” (Luke 14:31-32). Wars are inevitable, but it’s often wise to avoid them or end them quickly.

It could be that Putin miscalculated Ukraine’s ability to resist, and that he continues to miscalculate its endurance. Or it could be that the aging former KGB agent does not care about the flower of Russian manhood he is conscripting to die in a pointless fight.

The horrible character of war also holds great relevance to the United States at a time when Americans confront a more dangerous world full of ever-shifting alliances. The horror of war surely factors into President Trump’s thinking with regard to Iran. Last summer, Trump engaged in weeks of negotiation before pursuing a kinetic strike when talks led nowhere. Yet again, Trump has waited to launch a strike on a regime slaughtering its own citizens for weeks longer than commentators expected. But the president bears the incredible burden of life-and-death decisions, and his justifiable preference is to keep America out of a war.

At the same time, Trump has also directed bellicose rhetoric towards some of America’s close partners, issuing statements that sounded like calls for territorial annexation of Greenland and the Panama Canal.

On both questions, Trump seems to have backed away from his initial strident pose. With regard to Greenland, Trump reached an understanding with NATO allies that would allow the U.S. to take whatever measures are necessary on the island for our national security. And Trump recently secured a victory in Panama when the country’s Supreme Court invalidated a contract that allowed a Chinese-controlled company to run ports at either end of the canal.

However, on both questions, Trump likely could have secured the same outcomes without resorting to threats of invasion. Under a 1951 agreement with Denmark, the U.S. already had broad freedom to construct military installations on the ice-bound landmass. And agreements with Panama already forbade foreign influence in the canal zone, which would threaten America’s security interests.

When possible, avoiding war is good, and Trump has often (with the arguable exception of Venezuela) shown appropriate solemnity in authorizing the use of military force. But avoiding rumors of war is good, too, since such rumors only raise anxieties about war’s horror. On this point, Trump could show more restraint.