Micaela Hierro Dori is a professor at the University of Salvador in Argentina and has dedicated herself to working at the intersection of international relations and political science. She has led civil society organizations for 20 years, with a particular emphasis on defending democracy in Latin America.

Despite her youth, she knows, like few other Latin Americans, the long and arduous history of civic resistance in Cuba against the leftist regime that oppresses it and, by extension, the overseas colony that Venezuela became under Chavismo and the socialism of the 21st century.

In this interview, Hierro Dori offers an essential perspective on concepts such as “sovereignty,” so often misused these days by those who, after the operation against Nicolás Maduro on January 3, hide behind “international law” to defend a dictator.

In a recent article about the events of January 3 in Caracas, you emphasized that the declarations, reports, and pronouncements of the U.N. did not prevent the existence of more than a thousand political prisoners, systematic practices of torture, or the exercise of a policy of terror. What was happening in Venezuela during Maduro’s government?

The dictator Nicolás Maduro, successor to the other tyrant and populist, Hugo Chávez, with the support and advice of the totalitarian government of Cuba, committed crimes against humanity with complete impunity.

On the other hand, the international system tried to stop arbitrary detentions, torture practices, and forced disappearances with declarations and reports, urging the regime to respect human rights.

It seemed to ignore that whoever commits these crimes to remain in power has reached a point of “all or nothing”; they no longer care about their international reputation, they have already sold their soul to the devil, they have nothing left to lose.

You closely followed the 2024 summer electoral process in Venezuela in which the United Socialist Party, with Maduro as its candidate, was declared the winner by the National Electoral Council (CNE). Was the process legitimate?

Since the electoral process that took place in Venezuela in 2012, the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the impartiality with which the electoral authorities managed the election day and the vote count have been questioned.

However, the process of July 28, 2024, was an outright robbery; there was no fraud that could compare to it. The CNE officials didn’t even bother to hide the fact that they were committing every electoral crime imaginable: from altering or destroying ballots to threatening and disappearing citizens who were helping to monitor and protect the people’s vote.

The debate about the term “sovereignty” is now raging. What fundamental distinctions can we make between state sovereignty and popular sovereignty?

“State sovereignty” is the supreme and exclusive power exercised by the State as a legal and political entity within its territorial borders, such as, for example, the power to legislate and administer. On the other hand, “popular sovereignty” is the doctrine that affirms that the origin and legitimacy of that power reside in the people, who are the original holders of sovereignty and delegate it to state institutions through democratic mechanisms such as voting, establishing limits, and control over the government.

Territorial integrity is a direct consequence of state sovereignty and implies the defense of borders as a legal and political expression of the State. In turn, it is projected at the international level through the principle of non-intervention, enshrined in the United Nations Charter and in customary international law.

In short: the key distinction is that state sovereignty is the power exercised by the government, while popular sovereignty is the source of that power (the people). This implies that the State is a servant of the popular will.

Now let’s turn to the recent case of Venezuela. There, state sovereignty was being exercised by a completely illegal and illegitimate president who, in turn, systematically violated human rights. And that is where the two dimensions of the same concept collided.

State sovereignty is not absolute; there are limits accepted by the international community, such as the protection of human rights. Therefore, serious and systematic violations can trigger protection mechanisms such as supranational organizations, international courts, and regional protection systems.

It is also limited by the Responsibility to Protect (known in political science jargon as R2P) in extreme cases, such as the commission of genocide or crimes against humanity. Similarly, it should be limited by international treaties, as states voluntarily limit their sovereignty by adhering to or not adhering to certain agreements. These limits redefine sovereignty within an international legal order based on common norms.

You wrote: “The inefficiency — or inadequacy — of the international legal system can be interpreted as inaction: inaction not due to a lack of norms, but due to the political inability to apply them.” What do you mean by that?

There were countless denunciations and reports acknowledging the grave human rights situation in Venezuela through, for example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Resolutions of the U.N. Human Rights Council.

Note that the International Criminal Court (ICC) formally opened an investigation into Venezuela in 2021 for possible crimes against humanity related to torture, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, violence against opponents, etc. Since then, an active investigation into these events has been maintained, but no international arrest warrants have yet been issued against high-ranking officials such as the now-deposed Nicolás Maduro or Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello.

The investigation process has been unusually long, considering the large amount of evidence available, all presented to the ICC.

This lack of concrete action, the failure to react to calls to respect human rights, the release of political prisoners, or accountability, is permeated by a lack of political will or lukewarmness. This is especially irresponsible in the face of the urgent humanitarian crisis that Venezuela has been experiencing for at least 10 years of the 26 years that the dictatorship has been in power.

If there has been inaction on the part of the international community, there wasn’t much action from a unilateral point of view by the United States either (until January 3), even though there was a warrant for the arrest of Maduro and Cabello for terrorism and drug trafficking. Nor was there anything from regional organizations such as the European Union, which took restrictive measures against individuals linked to human rights violations through asset freezes and travel bans.

Does the Venezuelan case and the prolonged inaction in the face of serious human rights violations prove the urgency of changing the power and decision-making mechanisms of the international system?

The U.N. Human Rights Council does not have the power to impose coercive sanctions, such as travel bans, asset freezes, or embargoes. But perhaps it should. These measures are the exclusive domain of bodies like the Security Council.

But in that body, due to the veto power of China and Russia, partners of the Venezuelan dictatorship, all action has been blocked.

The U.N. has proposed converting the recommendations of the Human Rights Council and the Universal Periodic Review into binding follow-up obligations, so that they do not remain mere exhortations. It has even suggested that they automatically trigger compliance schedules with evaluation and diplomatic sanctions if they are not implemented.

To this end, it would be important to strengthen the complementarity between the U.N. and judicial mechanisms of the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice so that U.N. reports, which often document violations, are sent to courts or judicial mechanisms with enforcement power.

In your opinion, if the international community reacts firmly only when territorial sovereignty is “violated,” but tolerates for years the systematic violation of popular sovereignty, “the message is devastating: human rights become rhetorical, legality becomes selective, and impunity becomes negotiable.” Do you see parallels with what is happening in other countries in the region, such as Cuba today?

This double standard is not accidental. It is structural. Therefore, there are indeed parallels in Cuba, Nicaragua, and other countries.

For decades, the international system has treated Cuba as a “complex political case,” not as a country where there is a sustained violation of popular sovereignty. The result is the same devastating message.

As long as borders are not crossed, as long as there is no other Bay of Pigs, internal suffering can be managed diplomatically. In Cuba, as in Venezuela and Nicaragua, a dangerous logic has been established: repression becomes “context,” the lack of rights becomes a “political model,” the absence of democracy becomes “national political culture.”

Unlike Venezuela, where there is still a more or less open political dispute and intermittent international pressure, Cuba represents a case of prolonged and “stabilized” impunity. By accepting this for so long, the international community is sending an implicit message: some people can live indefinitely without popular sovereignty without it constituting an international emergency. This message erodes the universal value of human rights.