Over three months after former President Donald Trump was shot in the side of the head at a July 13 campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, a bipartisan U.S. House panel is releasing a report on the “stunning security failures” that resulted in 20-year-old Thomas Crooks’s assassination attempt. The Task Force on the Attempted Assassination of Donald J. Trump released an interim staff report on Monday, concluding that the assassination attempt was “preventable and should not have happened,” but did because the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) was ill-prepared for the event.

Here are the top findings of the Task Force’s report:

1. Communication between USSS and Other Law Enforcement Was ‘Fragmented’

One key factor in the security failures on July 13 was a lack of communication. Among other examples, the Task Force’s report noted that there was “no unified briefing” the day of the rally. The Butler Emergency Services Unit (ESU), the Butler Township Police Department, and the USSS all hosted separate briefings, and none of the security agencies participated in the briefings hosted by others. Butler ESU Commander Ed Lenz reported that, on the day of the rally, he “actually did not speak to anybody from the Secret Service until I had to make a phone call to the Secret Service specific to a possible threat that the 911 center received.” A state police liaison assigned to the USSS command post said that he was asked to attend the USSS briefing by one Secret Service agent but was subsequently told to leave by another.

“The lack of a unified briefing on July 13 may have led to gaps in awareness among state and local law enforcement partners as to who was stationed where, spheres of responsibility, and expectations regarding communications during the day,” the report observed.

Due to the “fragmented” nature of communications among law enforcement and security units, state and local police alerted one another to Crooks’s suspicious presence and behavior for at least 40 minutes prior to the Secret Service being alerted. Notably, there were two separate communications command posts during the rally: one for local law enforcement and one for the USSS and one state police representative. The report explained, “Though the Secret Service command post could have accommodated more people, key local law enforcement partners were in a separate trailer in a separate part of the vast Butler Farm Show property, and there was no dedicated radio link between law enforcement in the two posts.”

One witness, from the Butler County Sheriff’s Office, told other local law enforcement personnel prior to the rally, “We need to be able to talk to [state police]. We need to be able to talk to Secret Service,” observing how difficult that would be with two separate communications command posts. Former USSS agent Patrick Sullivan told the Task Force that it was “very unusual” to have two separate communications command posts. “Normally, there will be an overall command post for the entire visit,” he explained. “And the command post, the overall command post should be the state, local police, Secret Service, and other federal partners that may be assisting. So, this is very unusual that the way it turned out here at this site.” One witness testified that the USSS communications command post had 30 chairs but only six people using the command post.

Furthermore, the Task Force noted that the USSS’s “over-reliance on cell phones, instead of Secret Service radio frequencies, to communicate vital information,” likely contributed to the agency’s failure to recognize the threat posed by Crooks. It was also noted that “interoperability” issues with radios was a factor. For example, the radios used by state police were not compatible with radios by several local law enforcement entities, and the radios used by the USSS were seemingly incompatible with other law enforcement entities’ radios. Butler ESU attempted to address the interoperability issues and offer other law enforcement divisions its own radios but USSS agents “reportedly did not retrieve these radios.”

The Task Force’s report summarized, “Critical pieces of information about Crooks and the escalating threat situation at the AGR complex moved slowly due to fragmented lines of communication and unclear chains of command on July 13.”

2. Security for the Rally Was Poorly Planned

According to the Task Force’s report, the majority of security failures related to advance planning, which is planning and coordinating prior to the event what needs to be covered. “Over the course of twelve days — from July 2 through July 13 — the Secret Service’s planning and coordination for the campaign event in Butler appears to have been inadequate,” the report states. For one thing, the USSS “did not give clear guidance or direction to … local law enforcement partners” and “did not effectively verify responsibilities were understood and being executed” by state police and local law enforcement.

The USSS was also told, during a July 11 walkthrough of the event space, that the planning was “disorganized.” Lenz told the Task Force that “there was no structure to it. There was no, ‘Hey, let’s all talk and figure out what we have to do.’ It was really just a bunch of people sort of milling around the site” and “it did not seem organized at all.” But USSS Acting Director Ronald L. Rowe, Jr. told the Task Force that USSS assumed that “local police were going to adequately secure the AGR complex.”

3. The Roof Crooks Used to Shoot Trump Was Not Included in the USSS’s ‘Secure Perimeter’

The report also found that the AGR complex was not included in the USSS’s “secure perimeter,” despite the building’s “proximity to a main road, clear sight lines to the stage, and its elevated overlook…” Instead, the report noted, “Secret Service placed the AGR complex outside the secure perimeter for the event, and the AGR complex was not otherwise secured.” Crooks, who shot and wounded Trump and two rally attendees, and killed firefighter Corey Comperatore, used the AGR complex roof to open fire. The report stated, “The USSS failed to ensure the risks associated with the AGR property were addressed, both in terms of lines of sight to the stage and as an attractive area for crowds to gather.”

Pennsylvania State Police Lieutenant John Herold told the Task Force that, during a July 11 walkthrough of the event space, USSS “did not request assets to be placed at the AGR complex,” even though state police “had the resources to do so.” Instead, Herold reported, state police were under the impression that Butler County ESU was responsible for the AGR complex.

The USSS, on the other hand, told the Task Force that Herold himself had told USSS that state police had arranged for the AGR complex “to be closed, locked, and posted” two days prior to the walkthrough. The report noted that although the parking lot was closed, “a crowd gathered on the adjacent grassy area near the chain link fence that marked the outer perimeter established by the Secret Service. Onlookers in that area did not need to pass through the event’s magnetometers to see the rally stage — despite being approximately 150 yards from where the former President was speaking.”

Then again, Drew Blasko, a patrolman with the Butler Township Police Department and an assistant team leader with the Butler ESU, testified that he told USSS on July 11 about his concerns regarding securing the AGR complex, noting that he “did not have the manpower to post officers around the AGR property, and that he asked the Secret Service for additional officers to be posted there.” But the Secret Service told him that “they would take care of it.”

Regarding the AGR complex’s line of sight to shoot Trump, the Task Force noted that its “investigation found that Crooks had a clear line of sight to the rally stage from his position on the AGR complex roof.”

4. Security Team Snipers inside the AGR Were Not Positioned to Stop Crooks

Since the USSS did not station agents inside the AGR complex, it fell to local law enforcement to manage the site. Law enforcement witnesses told the Task Force that, largely due to the absence of clear communication from USSS, they “understood their assignment to be limited to overwatch of the rally site, rather than securing the AGR buildings, AGR roof[,] or the areas around the AGR complex.” Specifically, they said that USSS “did not give any guidance … regarding the placement, role, and responsibilities of their snipers on July 13, and that in the absence of any such guidance, they understood their assignment to be overwatch of the rally venue.”

As such, the AGR complex was not being watched. Instead, sniper teams were facing the campaign rally itself, and with limited lines of visibility. The report noted that “local ESU snipers positioned themselves inside the AGR complex, near windows facing the Butler Farm Show property, to conduct overwatch of the rally stage and crowd.” It continued, “The overwatch posture placed ESU personnel several feet back from the windows, looking through scopes toward the rally stage and crowd — unable to easily see the unsecured areas on the AGR property, including most of the rooftops of the AGR complex and the areas directly below the windows.”

Furthermore, local law enforcement snipers inside the AGR buildings were under the impression — again, due to poor communication — that other security and law enforcement personnel were responsible for securing the grounds of the AGR complex.

What’s Next?

The July 13 assassination attempt against Trump was followed, just two months later, by a second. Ryan Wesley Routh aimed an automatic rifle at the former president as he was golfing in West Palm Beach, Florida, on September 15.

There are still very few answers regarding either the security failures that have allowed these two assassination attempts or what has inspired them, but the Task Force pledged that it “will continue to rigorously investigate the July 13 assassination attempt in the coming months” and “remains committed to uncovering the planning and security failures that led to the events of July 13, of which there appear to be many, and to examining potential legislative solutions to ensure the USSS is equipped to fulfill their ‘zero fail’ mission.”

The report also noted that the Task Force has received “expanded jurisdiction” and will be investigating the September 15 assassination attempt also.