Beijing’s latest move should sharpen Washington’s understanding of the AI contest. Commercial leadership matters, but the larger prize is national power: the political leverage that comes from supplying the systems other nations depend on.

On October 16, China proposed export controls covering 23 AI technologies, including models, agents, and computing clusters. The broader restrictions remain under consultation through November 15, but registration requirements for certain overseas technology transfers took effect the same day. Access through apps, websites, and cloud services would remain available.

Beijing is drawing a strategic distinction: restrict transfers of sensitive capabilities while allowing Chinese companies to expand overseas services. That approach protects its technological edge and deepens foreign dependence at the same time.

In my 2026 book, “The New AI Cold War: Liberty vs. Tyranny in the Age of Machine Empires,” I warned that AI competition is ultimately about political authority, national independence, and the survival of human freedom. Nations that supply essential infrastructure and systems can gain influence that lasts long after the initial sale.

That is AI statecraft: using technological capability, commercial relationships, and access to essential resources to advance national interests.

Consider what happens when a government purchases a foreign surveillance platform. The contract can bring financing, maintenance, training, and years of software updates. Changing suppliers becomes expensive. Decisions about public security may depend on technology the purchasing country cannot fully inspect or maintain itself.

China’s role in that market is documented. A 2019 Carnegie study identified Chinese suppliers of AI surveillance technology in 63 countries — Huawei alone in at least 50 — and found that Chinese sales pitches often came with soft loans to close the deal. The findings are dated, but they prove Beijing was exporting these tools long before ChatGPT became a household word.

Buying Chinese surveillance gear does not make a country Beijing’s client overnight, but it hands an authoritarian government stronger tools to monitor its people and binds it to a foreign supplier. Commercial transactions deserve scrutiny when they shape the relationship between rulers and citizens.

The same concern now extends to AI models. A Microsoft report published in January 2026 estimated DeepSeek’s market share at 56% in Belarus, 49% in Cuba, and 43% in Russia. It attributed wider adoption partly to free access and distribution partnerships, including with Huawei in Africa. That is why Beijing’s decision to keep its services open abroad matters. A widely used chatbot shapes what information people find and which perspectives they hear.

Other governments see the danger. The European Commission’s AI Continent Action Plan expressly connects AI development with sovereignty, security, and democracy. The plan identifies €20 billion in financing for up to five AI “gigafactories” and a goal of tripling EU data center capacity within five to seven years. Brussels understands that excessive dependence on foreign computing infrastructure carries strategic costs.

As I explain in the book, countries such as India, Japan, Israel, and South Korea matter as well. Their expertise and partnerships can strengthen America’s position. Washington should approach them as sovereign partners with interests of their own. A strategy that assumes American technological leadership will automatically secure their cooperation invites disappointment.

There is another constraint that no diplomatic agreement can wish away. AI requires physical infrastructure.

Chapter 11 of “The New AI Cold War” examines the material foundations of AI power: semiconductors, electricity, computing facilities, and communications. A sophisticated model cannot compensate for an unavailable power supply or a severed connection. National strength depends partly on whether those supporting systems survive pressure.

In February 2024, CISA and its partners warned that China’s Volt Typhoon hackers were seeking to “pre-position themselves” for disruptive or destructive activity against American critical infrastructure “in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States.”

That advisory named no attack on an American AI data center, but it exposed threats to the energy and communications networks every data center needs. Defending those networks belongs at the center of America’s AI strategy.

The Trump administration has already taken a significant step toward treating AI as statecraft. Its July 2025 executive order directed a coordinated effort to export American AI technology packages, supported by federal financing tools and diplomacy. The order encompasses hardware, cloud services, models, and security measures. In March 2026, the Commerce Department announced a call for industry proposals, offering selected consortia priority export-license reviews and preferred access to federal credit programs.

That approach recognizes that international influence grows through the adoption of complete systems. Americans should judge its success by whether it builds trustworthy partnerships and reduces coercive dependence. At home, Washington must expand dependable power, secure supply chains, and coordinate targeted technology controls with allies.

For Christians, however, national advantage cannot be the final measure of success.

Genesis 1:27 teaches that God created man in His own image. Human dignity therefore precedes the state and does not depend on economic usefulness, political loyalty, or an algorithm’s assessment. A government that uses AI to silence believers or punish peaceful dissent violates a dignity it did not create and has no authority to revoke.

That principle must govern America’s conduct as well. We cannot credibly oppose digital repression abroad while accepting unaccountable surveillance at home. American companies should not receive a moral exemption simply because their products compete with Chinese technology.

Romans 13:4 describes governing authority as “God’s servant for your good.” That authority is accountable to God. When officials ordered the apostles to stop teaching in Jesus’s name, they refused, placing obedience to God above human commands (Acts 5:29). AI does not give government authority over conscience, and it does not relieve officials of responsibility when they abuse their power. A machine’s recommendation absolves no one.

Christians should support prudent national defense while resisting the temptation to place ultimate confidence in technological superiority. Psalm 20:7 declares, “Some trust in chariots and some in horses, but we trust in the name of the LORD our God.”

As I argued in “The New AI Cold War,” America must compete with authoritarian powers while refusing to imitate their methods. Christians should insist that AI policy protect people made in God’s image, preserve freedom of conscience, and keep those who wield power accountable. No technological edge justifies disobedience to God.