The engines are warming up for the Brazilian presidential election, which will reach its peak this coming October. The question is whether the South American giant will follow the trend of its neighbors and shift toward a government that aligns more closely with the Trump administration.

We are already seeing a resurgence of the political landscape that has dominated Brazil in recent decades. On one side stands the socialist pole — aligned with the Castro axis — represented by former union leader Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, leader of the Workers’ Party. On the other is Flávio Bolsonaro — heir to the Bolsonaro clan and son of former president and right-wing icon Jair Bolsonaro — representing the Liberal Party.

Flávio, a senator for the populous city of Rio de Janeiro, took up the candidacy after his father became a political pariah — Lula — and was barred from competing due to legal maneuvers.

Today, the race between the two candidates is much tighter than it appeared months ago. An August Datafolha poll gave Lula 39% support compared to Flávio’s 33% in the first round, with a potential 47%-43% lead for the leftist in the runoff. However, the most recent PoderData/Aya poll — also conducted in August — narrowed the gap to 38%-35% in the first round and 45%-44% in the second, effectively a statistical tie.

Polls in Latin America are, as we know, an exercise in juggling interests rather than a matter of mathematics and statistics; consequently, they must be viewed with skepticism. From this data, one might salvage only this: the Brazilian people are ready to do battle against “21st-century socialism” — especially given the state in which it has left the country.

It is not only the Bolsonaros’s solid electoral base that applauds a change, but also segments of the working class affected by corruption and public security issues — key themes of the campaign. Regarding the first point, the numbers are clear. The most significant phenomenon of the last five years is the territorial expansion and professionalization of the main organizations, the PCC and the Comando Vermelho. Both now have a presence across virtually all of Brazil and maintain international connections.

An analysis from 2026 indicates that both groups are present in all 27 federal units, although each maintains hegemony in different states. Furthermore, recent investigations document alliances between major factions and local groups in 17 states. In short: under Lula, organized crime is forming wider networks.

Residents of less affluent neighborhoods see insecurity spiraling — sometimes involving violent scenes, such as those witnessed in Rio de Janeiro in October 2025. This is why Flávio Bolsonaro enjoys strong support among evangelicals and in the country’s South and Center-West regions. These groups do not want this phenomenon to reach them with the same intensity currently plaguing Brazil’s major cities.

Regarding the issue of corruption, recent investigations into Fábio Luís Lula da Silva — known as “Lulinha,” the current president’s eldest son — have played right into the hands of the right-wing campaign. The federal police have opened three separate inquiries before the Supreme Federal Court concerning possible influence peddling and the alleged granting of favors to companies by public agencies.

One of the main lines of inquiry examines messages from lobbyist Roberta Luchsinger requesting Lulinha’s intervention to facilitate business deals involving medicinal cannabis products and dengue fever kits.

His father, who will seek a fourth term in October, is himself tainted by a history of corruption. In 2017, he was initially sentenced to nearly 10 years in prison following Operation Lava Jato, which investigated an extensive bribery network centered on the state-owned oil company Petrobras. Other allegations maintained that construction firms linked to Petrobras had provided benefits to Lula and his inner circle.

The convictions were overturned by the Supreme Federal Court in 2021 — not because the socialist leader was declared innocent, but due to technicalities, such as the Curitiba courts lacking jurisdiction to try those cases. That maneuver restored his political rights and enabled his 2022 candidacy — only to result in the imprisonment of his main political opponent, the leader of the Bolsonaro clan.

Brazil’s weight in the region and on the global stage certainly should not be in the hands of the Left. As a major player in the global economy — given the size of its economy, with a projected GDP of around $2.28 trillion in 2025, and a domestic market of over 213 million people — the nation’s potential is stifled under the reins of a statist government willing to subvert democratic institutions.

However, within the great regional alliance led by President Donald Trump, Brazil could become an unparalleled force for the common good, regional security, and freedom.