Selling Information: Academia as a Weapon (Part 4)
Read Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3
In 2018, Colonel Chris Simmons — former chief of the counterintelligence unit for Cuba at the Defense Intelligence Agency — asserted that the island nation had more than 200 agents dispersed throughout U.S. territory. Part of their mission involved selling intelligence information to third countries.
In an interview, he explained that during the Cold War, the majority of Havana’s agents operated under the conviction that the work they were performing served to protect the regime.
However, in the 21st century, the sale of classified U.S. information had become one of the top five revenue streams generating foreign currency for the Castro regime. In this regard, Cuba reportedly served as an early warning and prevention source for U.S. adversaries — such as North Korea — specifically concerning U.S. military operations.
Havana also reportedly “sold stolen technology” to other adversaries of Washington — such as the Iranian theocracy — according to a recent interview with a former Cuban intelligence officer.
Following this line of evidence, universities appear to be among the targets for the extraction of sensitive information — operations potentially orchestrated by Castro’s intelligence apparatus and its agents within the United States.
It is not without reason that some observers warn that, in any research endeavor, authors must be diligent in safeguarding and managing the data they handle, “in order to preserve its integrity and prevent the theft of intellectual property (whether academic or commercial) or non-compliance with federal regulations — regardless of whether they are subject to, or the specific targets of, foreign influence.”
The FBI, for its part, has identified a number of technological fields as priority areas requiring protection against unwanted foreign influence. All of these fields have a foothold in higher education research centers — both public and private.
The list ranges from information technology, energy-efficient and new-energy vehicles, to aerospace equipment, marine engineering and high-tech vessels, and biomedicine. In June 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that two Chinese nationals had been charged with attempting to smuggle a toxic fungus — which could be used as a biological weapon — into a laboratory at the University of Michigan (UM).
Added to this case were charges against three other Chinese nationals, also linked to UM, on counts of conspiracy to smuggle biological materials into the United States.
Such issues came to light during a hearing held by the U.S. House Committee on Education and the Workforce. Domenico Grasso, president of UM, stated that the university is implementing measures to combat foreign espionage.
How? Grasso explained that this involves expanding the use of background checks for visiting researchers, strengthening oversight of biological materials entering or leaving university laboratories, and working to establish more regular lines of communication with federal regulatory, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies.
Added to this should be the constant monitoring and review of who has access to the most sensitive information, along with measures to ensure that such information remains secure. This approach is recommended for businesses by the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center, but it could equally be applied to institutions of all kinds.
Robust internal governance could prevent increased vulnerability in hiring practices and in relationships with malign foreign actors. Internal audits, reviews of international contracts, and clear ethical protocols are valuable tools in this regard.
“Open and democratic societies with a strong rule of law face a structural disadvantage when confronting agents working on behalf of dictatorial regimes or adversaries,” noted researcher María Werlau in a report. “Proving that an academic is a foreign agent is nearly impossible — and extremely costly — given the strong protections currently in place for freedom of expression.”
What is clear is that unless the Cuban state — and other anti-American actors — are made to face the harshest possible consequences, the battle is lost. To underestimate the resolve of those who hate this country is to turn a blind eye to recent history.


