The recent military operation that removed dictator Nicolás Maduro from Caracas and brought him before U.S. courts has focused the world’s attention on Venezuela. But lawyer Teresa Flores’s attention has been on that country and its allies for years, as has her interest in defending religious freedom.

A Peruvian, she lives in Chiclayo, a city almost unknown internationally, which in recent months has attracted attention as a center of “religious tourism.” The reason? The new pope of the Catholic Church, Leo XIV, spent part of his South American ministry there, when he was still simply Robert Francis Prevost. He ate there, visited this building, and met that neighbor. With that, interest in religious issues is also multiplying.

Eleven years ago, Flores understood how her professional work as a lawyer aligned with the protection of this right, after participating in the Blackstone Legal Fellowship of Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF). She then worked for organizations connected to the issue, until joining the Observatory of Religious Freedom in Latin America (OLIRE), which she has directed since 2020, and where she monitors, documents, and analyzes restrictions and violations in the region. Unfortunately, her work seems to be increasing in a context marked by socialist regimes, guerrilla groups, and the rise of organized crime.

Here is my interview with Teresa.

First, I think it’s crucial to revisit what religious freedom is and how it is understood holistically by organizations like OLIRE.

The right to religious freedom is broader than commonly understood. For many, this right is reduced to the possibility of attending religious services or worship; however, it includes many more freedoms. For example, the freedom to found schools or seminaries, to express and disseminate one’s beliefs through publications or other means, or to instill them in one’s children.

Lacking a clear understanding of the scope of all these freedoms makes it practically impossible to recognize when this right is being limited or not. It is also important to understand that the right to religious freedom is not the right of a religion, but of every human being, regardless of their faith, as it applies to both believers and non-believers.

It is an intrinsic human right, and in that sense, states are only responsible for recognizing it in their legal systems. Laws do not grant it; in principle, they must recognize, guarantee, and promote it. It is one of the first human rights recognized as such, predating many other civil, political, and social rights. And the way in which a government protects or restricts it is usually a very clear indicator of its level of respect for human rights in general.

Knowing that their regimes are united by leftist political doctrines, what unites and what distinguishes the violations of religious freedom in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela?

The similarities, as I explained a few months ago to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), are numerous.

One is the instrumentalization of religion for political purposes. In all three countries, governments selectively use religious language, leaders, or institutions to legitimize their policies and suppress dissent. Religious actors are tolerated only when they echo official narratives or avoid criticism.

There are also restrictive legal and administrative frameworks. Authorities employ highly discretionary registration systems, excessive bureaucratic controls, and vague legal provisions to limit religious activity. This provides governments with broad power to arbitrarily deny legal recognition, obstruct religious gatherings, or dissolve religious organizations.

Is there any other element that unifies in that sense the regimes of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua?

Another element that unifies the regimes that you mentioned is the targeting of independent and prophetic voices. Religious leaders and communities that provide social assistance, advocate for human rights, or denounce corruption and abuses are particularly vulnerable to surveillance, harassment, and in some cases forced exile or imprisonment.

At the same time, the creation of state-aligned religious structures proliferates. Each government promotes or relies on religious organizations that act as political arms of the regime. In Cuba, the Council of Churches and the Office of Religious Affairs serve as gatekeepers, facilitating recognition and visibility only for those aligned with the government. In Venezuela, the Vice Ministry of Religious Affairs and Worship and the apparent rapprochement with certain evangelical groups reflect a similar pattern of co-optation. In Nicaragua, the recently more visible Federation of Evangelical Churches plays a comparable role, gathering non-oppositional churches and receiving special benefits not granted to others.

In Havana, Managua, and Caracas, legal weaponization is a tool of repression. Laws regulating associations, foreign funding, national security, or “public order” are deliberately applied against religious groups and leaders. This legal weaponization not only justifies arbitrary state actions but also creates a permanent climate of fear and self-censorship among faith communities.

All these similarities reveal a broader trend: religious freedom is tolerated only when subordinated to political control, while independent religious activity is perceived as a threat to regime stability.

And the differences?

In Cuba, the patterns of religious freedom violations have remained relatively stable; the structure continues to be systematic and sustained, with little change over time. The repression is primarily directed against religious minorities and non-registered churches, and arbitrariness remains the rule, depending on the degree of perceived dissent or activism against the government. Also, the state seeks to keep religious groups “in check” and continues to interfere in the family sphere, with risks to parental rights, particularly related to the indoctrination of children in schools, which aligns with constitutional changes that grant legal legitimacy to repression.

Although Cuba originally created the model of religious repression, it is now following Nicaragua’s example by trying to formalize that repression through constitutional changes.

In Nicaragua, the legal system underpinning repression is harsher and more solid. The repression has changed form: from visible acts such as mass arrests, deportations, or widespread shutdowns of organizations to subtler yet sustained pressure and hostility. The state seeks to secure loyalty from religious communities, especially evangelical, through the conditioning of their legal status to continue operating in the country. On the other hand, public presence and influence of the Catholic Church are being restricted using monitoring, surveillance, and silencing. There is a formalization of repression through manipulated legal frameworks, particularly following recent constitutional reforms; the Nicaraguan government is attempting to align evangelical churches with their interests, which resembles the Venezuelan model.

In Venezuela, the main difference is that the government’s relationship with religious communities shifts depending on the political moment. For example, last year there was a clear attempt to manipulate the “Christian vote,” which led to increased pressure on churches to demonstrate loyalty to the government. This year, since that political need has passed, the government no longer emphasizes proximity to the churches and instead even allows itself to confront them more openly. There have been confrontational statements against the Catholic Church and even some arrests of evangelical pastors, which had not happened in the previous year. A key risk in Venezuela is the role of criminal groups, particularly along the country’s borders, where they exert pressure and control over religious communities, adding a further layer of threat beyond state action.