Imagine this scenario: 1) A head of state, without any remorse and on national television, threatens to imprison the opposition leader as soon as the presidential election concludes. 2) Within 24 hours of the election’s end, judicial authorities — allies of the president — order the seizure of the other candidate’s passport, initiating a case that could lead to his being imprisoned in the very same prison that had already claimed the previous opposition leader.

Sadly, this story is real. It unfolded just a few weeks ago in Brazil. Flávio Bolsonaro, a leader of the Liberal Party — whose father, former President Jair Bolsonaro, is currently imprisoned by order of judges aligned with socialist President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva — was forced to flee the country last week.

The Supreme Federal Court (STF) had issued a travel ban against Flávio, linking him to an investigation into alleged money laundering and currency evasion. Faced with this, Bolsonaro left the country clandestinely with his wife and two daughters, traveling to the United States via Argentina.

Given these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the political opposition in Brazil is being pursued with great ferocity. Compounding this are severe threats to freedom of expression, ranging from the targeting of opposition voices on social media to — in instances where platforms like X or Rumble refuse to do the Brazilian state’s “dirty work” by suppressing the digital spaces of dissidents — the outright banning of those entire platforms nationwide.

The crackdown on independent media has not ceased since the controversial presidential election on Sunday, October 25. Agents of the Legislative Police interrupted a live broadcast by conservative journalist Déborah Sena from within the Brazilian Congress. According to the website UNH Plus, Sena reported that she was treated “like a criminal.”

Will this finally trigger alarms among organizations like Reporters Without Borders regarding the persecution of the press? Or is it the case that as long as a government leans to the left, it is possible to turn a blind eye — just as has been done in the past when faced with abuses of this nature? How many more political exiles, and how many more attacks on individual liberties, must there be before the “NGO-industrial complex” acknowledges the dictatorial path along which Lula’s left is steering South America’s largest nation?

They did not speak up when, in June 2020, the judiciary authorized access to the bank records of 11 pro-Bolsonaro lawmakers; nor when, in 2025, authorities searched the homes of two conservative legislators. International media outlets have played a leading role in the decline of Brazil’s democratic institutions, shielding Lula while pinning the label “far-right” on the Bolsonaro name and his supporters — who are, in turn, being persecuted by the judicial branch.

Carlos Sánchez Berzaín, head of the think tank Interamerican Institute for Democracy (whom we have consulted previously in this publication), has described the regime in Brasília as “para-dictatorial.”

In his view, Lula has resisted relinquishing power to avoid accountability; by securing a fourth presidential term, he will keep Brazil divided, ensure continued support for dictatorships, and perpetuate instability across the Americas.

Sánchez Berzaín asserts that electoral processes under the control of governments adhering to so-called “21st-century socialism” have been marked by “egregious and proven instances of fraud and manipulation.” He points to Venezuela under Chávez and Maduro, Nicaragua under Ortega and Murillo, Bolivia under Morales and Arce, Ecuador under Correa, Colombia under Petro, and Argentina under the Kirchners; similar allegations have also been raised in Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Mexico.

“The alteration of systems and laws, the use of subservient judges, the manipulation of electoral registries, and the weaponization of the judicial system to disqualify political opponents have become standard practices for rigging election results across the region,” the former Bolivian minister noted.

According to Sánchez Berzaín, the “triumph” of Lula has exacerbated the crisis of institutional credibility — driven by judicial manipulation — while fostering a climate of daily fear for up to 81% of the population, who live in constant dread of being caught in urban gunfire. Furthermore, it has facilitated the expansion of large-scale organized crime, involving criminal syndicates such as the “Primeiro Comando da Capital” (First Capital Command) and the “Comando Vermelho” (Red Command).

On the international front, these regimes — effectively dictatorships — are undoubtedly celebrating. The political analyst argues that Lula’s administration guarantees continued support for Cuba and Nicaragua, as well as for the forces resisting a return to democracy in Venezuela and Bolivia.

All of this undermines the State Department’s regional security architecture and runs counter to the Donroe Doctrine. It could be summarized as follows: following a wave of right-wing governments, Washington squandered an opportunity in Brazil to gain a key ally, while the Havana-centered axis grew stronger — bolstered by a judicial dictatorship that is already wreaking havoc.