María José Brito presides over the Acorde 33 Foundation, which monitors and educates on respect for religious freedom within Venezuela. She describes the organization as a think tank that connects Christian communities and political institutions to also promote democracy and innovative leadership. Its main objective is to reach young people living under Chavismo, in a country where this topic doesn’t make headlines as often as the violation of other civil liberties.

A recent report by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) includes the South American nation alongside Nicaragua and Cuba as part of an “authoritarian triad” in which faith leaders are especially “vulnerable to attacks” by state entities.

This year, Venezuela appeared on the list of the NGO Open Doors, which tracks and denounces the persecution of Christians worldwide. The country ranked 60th among those where the greatest pressures and abuses occur.

Brito, now in exile in the Dominican Republic, is intimately familiar with the reality for religious groups in her country, a reality that is painful and has been underreported for years.

Here is Part 1 of my interview with María. (Read Part 2)

What is life like for a human rights activist under Venezuelan socialism, according to your experience? What are you doing now that you are in exile?

I confess that I felt afraid due to the government harassment I experienced.

In the digital realm alone, my X account was hacked, and the authorities also attempted to access my email. This forced me to stop for security reasons.

I feel I should have addressed this issue months ago, and that’s why I’m incredibly grateful for spaces like this interview.

Currently, I work at the University of the Caribbean (UNICARIBE, in Spanish) as the coordinator of the Environmental Management and Energy Resources program. In addition, I collaborate with the vice-rectorate for research, strengthening the university’s research ecosystem, preparing reports, and monitoring the institution’s position in university rankings.

In general, what is the current landscape of the religious sphere in Chavista Venezuela? And what would you identify as the biggest obstacles and current problems for full religious freedom in your country?

According to the 2021 National Survey of Living Conditions, led by Andrés Bello Catholic University, 89.4% of the Venezuelan population identified themselves as Christian. Within this group, the Catholic Church represented 70.7%, while evangelical and Pentecostal churches accounted for 18.7%. Other religions, such as Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and those of African origin, represent a much smaller percentage of the population. Since the time of Hugo Chávez, I can tell you that there have been incidents against religious freedom, such as attacks on synagogues in 2009.

This right was also the subject of debate after the approval of the 2009 Organic Education Law. At that time, numerous events occurred, as the law promoted the avoidance of religion in classrooms. For its part, the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference maintained, through pronouncements, declarations, and various instances of opposition from the church, that it violated the right to spread and preach the faith.

However, both Chávez and his political successor, the now imprisoned Nicolás Maduro, were seen in public with religious items such as rosaries and mentioned God in their speeches. What was their true relationship with religion?

For Chávez, religious mysticism was part of his life and his discourse. He built his image around religious syncretism. Although he declared himself Catholic until his last speeches, he was inclined towards the worship of Cuban Santería and the female deity of Venezuelan spiritism known as María Lionza. There is extensive research on this topic by journalist David Placer titled “Chávez’s Witches.”

At the same time, the relationship between the Cuban and Venezuelan regimes strengthened with the formation of a network of babalawos (Afro-Cuban priests) to advise political and military leaders. In this behavior, it is possible to notice a religious tendency that responds to personal interests.

This relationship of mythical and religious elements within political discourse did not change after Chávez’s death, but rather deepened.

Nicolás Maduro inaugurated his presidential political career with the famous speech in which he alludes to the fact that Chávez’s spirit had transformed into a bird and had visited him to give him a message.

Maduro built his discourse not only on the alleged symbolic capital of the “heir” of the supreme commander but also began his own relationship with the religious sector.

During the 2018 presidential campaign, Pastor Javier Bertucci, a relatively unknown figure and leader of a new party he created called El Cambio (The Change), achieved third place in the elections. 10.75% of the participants in that election cast their vote for him; that is, a total of 988,761 Venezuelans, mostly evangelicals or their sympathizers.

Seeing this success, Maduro approached the evangelical group with the aim of securing their vote. In 2019, he instituted the Day of the Pastor, celebrated every second Sunday of January; he then created the government program “My Good Shepherd,” which provided economic bonuses or donations of musical instruments to affiliated religious organizations.

Are there other government programs like the one you described? What is the underlying intention of the Chavismo?

It is within the Protestant churches that the Venezuelan state has tried to establish a greater presence. Their main tool in this endeavor has been the “social missions” or government programs, such as the Venezuela Bella Mission, and the My Well-Equipped Church and My Good Shepherd programs, which I mentioned earlier.

Through all of this, they provide resources to these institutions. However, as expected, some participants immediately realize that behind these initiatives there is an intention to “benefit” economically disadvantaged religious sectors, in the hope that they will spread a pro-government message among the church membership.

A young pastor I met, for example, confirmed this to me with these words: “Of course, these pastors will spread that partisan message to the rest of the congregants in each church.”

Nicolás Maduro Guerra, son of the recently arrested dictator Nicolás Maduro, is the man appointed by the Chavista regime to control religious organizations. How does the system work in this regard?

The appointment of Nicolás Maduro Guerra as vice president for religious affairs of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) allowed him to operate as director of Religious Affairs for Internal Relations, Justice, and Peace.

This represented a change in strategy regarding how to approach the religious sector. This played a prominent role in the presidential campaign leading up to July 28, 2024. During that time, Maduro Guerra toured both evangelical and Catholic churches, presided over mass events in stadiums with followers of the Yoruba religion, and held a series of meetings with various religious representatives. He said he wanted to bring the PSUV closer, “with love, to the hearts of the people.”

Currently, what was merely an office for the direction of religion and worship has become a vice ministry with greater relevance and authority within the regime’s internal politics.