During President Trump’s summit with China’s Xi Jinping on Thursday, the two superpowers reportedly agreed that the Strait of Hormuz “must remain open” and that Iran “can never have a nuclear weapon.” The apparent consensus came amid reports that Xi’s communist regime is exploring ways to covertly send Tehran weapons in the midst of the U.S.’s effort to halt the Islamist regime’s nuclear program.

In a readout of the meeting between the two leaders, the White House stated, “The two sides agreed that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open to support the free flow of energy. President Xi also made clear China’s opposition to the militarization of the Strait and any effort to charge a toll for its use, and he expressed interest in purchasing more American oil to reduce China’s dependence on the Strait in the future. Both countries agreed that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon.”

In recent weeks, Iran has declared the Strait of Hormuz, in which approximately a third of the world’s oil flows, to be closed until the U.S. ends its blockade of Iranian ships. The Islamist regime has also demanded that tolls be paid for safe passage through the Strait, despite the fact that the waterway is considered an international strait in which ships must be allowed to transit unimpeded according to international law established by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

China’s stated desire to keep the Strait open lines up with its history of being the foremost consumer of illicit Iranian oil, importing between 80 to 90% of Iran’s total exports and transferring the oil ship-to-ship to avoid sanctions. (The U.S. announced new sanctions Monday against four Hong Kong-based companies for facilitating shipments of Iranian oil to China.)

But Beijing’s declared wish of a nuclear-free Iran appears to clash with new reports of the communist regime considering supplying weapons to Tehran. According to a New York Times report published Wednesday, “Chinese companies have been discussing arms sales with Iran, plotting to send the weapons through other countries to mask the origins of the military aid.” The news comes in the wake of reports last month that China likely sent shoulder-fired missiles (known as MANPADS) to Iran, which were used to take down a U.S. F-15E.

Experts like Lt. Col. (Ret.) Robert Maginnis, an author who serves as senior fellow for National Security at Family Research Council, say that the Trump administration should not take Xi Jinping at face value regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

“China’s leadership often pursues parallel and sometimes contradictory tracks simultaneously: publicly supporting stability while privately advancing relationships that increase Beijing’s leverage and weaken American influence,” he told The Washington Stand. “China has strong reasons to oppose a major regional war in the Middle East. Roughly half of China’s imported oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making freedom of navigation there a core Chinese economic interest. Beijing also wants stable energy prices, uninterrupted shipping lanes, and the appearance of being a responsible global power. So, when Xi says the Strait ‘must remain open,’ that statement aligns directly with China’s economic self-interest.”

“However, that does not necessarily mean Beijing shares Washington’s broader strategic objectives,” Maginnis continued. “China’s relationship with Iran is rooted in long-term geopolitical calculations. Tehran serves as a counterweight to U.S. influence in the Middle East, a major energy supplier, a partner in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and a strategic distraction that forces Washington to divide military resources between the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. From Beijing’s perspective, a weakened but still defiant Iran may actually serve Chinese interests better than either regime collapse or outright regional war.”

According to Maginnis, reports involving covert military assistance deserve “close scrutiny.” “If Chinese firms or intermediaries — read Beijing’s arms dealers — are helping Iran acquire weapons while Beijing publicly calls for restraint, that would fit a familiar pattern of strategic ambiguity. China has often preferred indirect support mechanisms that provide plausible deniability while still advancing its regional interests. Even if the Chinese government is not directly authorizing every transaction, Beijing bears responsibility for the conduct of companies operating within its strategic orbit.”

As to how the U.S. should approach China with regard to the Iran war, Maginnis advised “a mixture of realism, pressure, and narrowly defined cooperation.”

“First, Washington should recognize that China is not a neutral mediator in the Iran conflict. Beijing is pursuing Chinese interests, not American interests. Any diplomacy must begin with that understanding,” he underscored. “Second, the administration should demand transparency regarding any Chinese military-related transfers to Iran, whether direct or indirect. If evidence exists of sanctions violations or covert weapons facilitation, there should be consequences targeting the responsible firms, financial institutions, and intermediaries.”

Maginnis further contended that the U.S. “should continue engaging China diplomatically because Beijing does possess leverage over Tehran, particularly economically. China remains one of Iran’s most important energy customers and trading partners. That influence could prove useful in limiting escalation if Beijing concludes regional instability threatens its broader interests.”

Maginnis, who served as an Airborne Ranger infantry officer in four infantry divisions on three continents and who currently serves as a senior contractor and consultant to the Army, went on to argue that “Washington should avoid allowing China to portray itself as the indispensable ‘peace broker’ while simultaneously benefiting strategically from American entanglement in the Middle East. Beijing increasingly seeks diplomatic prestige without assuming equivalent security burdens.”

“The broader issue here is that the Iran conflict cannot be separated from the larger strategic competition between the United States and China,” he emphasized. “The Middle East is becoming another arena within a wider geopolitical struggle involving energy security, trade routes, military positioning, artificial intelligence, cyber operations, and global influence.”

“In many respects, this resembles a new Cold War dynamic,” Maginnis added. “China may cooperate tactically with the United States in certain areas while simultaneously competing aggressively against American interests elsewhere. That means Washington must remain open to selective cooperation but never lose sight of the underlying strategic rivalry.”