Are Military Review Boards Really Defying Hegseth’s Transgender Military Policy?
In a Friday article, The New York Times published its unofficial tally of appeals by transgender-identifying military servicemembers who face separation under War Secretary Pete Hegseth’s transgender policy. Under the title, “Hegseth Barred Trans Troops. Military Boards Are Rejecting Those Orders,” the article promoted the narrative that military review boards are defying Hegseth’s policy. But the evidence supporting this narrative is thin, and the Times may have even helped to prove the opposite of their point. So, what exactly is going on?
Stating the Case
In February 2025, the War Department announced that “individuals who have a current diagnosis or history of … gender dysphoria are no longer eligible for military service.” It offered to pay several thousand transgender-identifying personnel to leave the military, but several chose to fight to remain, following a military appeals process even as the legal fortunes of the military’s new policy went down, then up, up again, then down again. In September, the Trump administration appealed the most recent decision against it to the Supreme Court (again).
The military appeals process involves a hearing before three-person review boards, drawn up uniquely for each case from military personnel.
The Times insinuates that the War Department fixed these boards to expel transgender-identifying servicemembers without due process. “The members are given a one-page findings sheet and instructed to circle a few words to find that a service member exhibits evidence of being transgender and therefore is not qualified to serve and should be discharged,” the report states. “They are not allowed to consider whether a person is a top performer, a specialist in a critical career field or a decorated combat veteran.” The Pentagon allegedly saddled the boards with “narrow orders that all but ensured that the trans troops appearing before them would be voted out.”
They allege that, “across the military,” the hearings “follow a pattern.” By their count, the U.S. Army has held “about 50” board hearings but only recommended against discharge in “about five cases.” In “about six” known cases, review boards in the U.S. Air Force have recommended separation every time.
By contrast, the Times reports that the review boards recommended that a transgender-identifying servicemember was qualified to remain on duty in seven out of nine cases heard in the U.S. Navy and in two out of three cases heard in the U.S. Marines.
The Times explores two possible reasons for these differing rates: timing and culture. It notes that the Army “was the first to hold hearings, beginning in February,” followed by the Air Force “this summer,” the Navy in July, and the Marines in August.
Analyzing the Narrative
The Times offers this as circumstantial evidence to advance their narrative that, sometime in the summer, military review boards became bold enough to flagrantly violate orders and rescue their transgender-identifying colleagues from Hegseth the Bogeyman’s kangaroo courts. It further cites the anecdotal testimony of one defense lawyer, Priya Rashid, who “after losing nearly all of her initial cases,” said “she saw a stark shift this summer.”
Secondly, the Times explores “cultural factors” specific to the various branches. It cites a 2015 RAND report showing the Navy had twice the rate of LGBT-identifying servicemembers as any other branch (9%). For the Marines, it suggested the explanation might lay in the branch’s emphasis on fraternal loyalty.
The Times describes such votes as “a stunning rebuke from the armed forces, where following orders is bedrock.” They dare to suggest that “the military’s transgender ban is being rejected by the very troops the administration says the ban is meant to serve.”
This narrative does not quite match the evidence. It alleges a pattern of behavior across the military, followed by a trend towards not separating servicemembers, also across the entire military. However, by its own admission, the Times can only arguably show evidence in two of the four main service branches. The argument would be more compelling if the Times offered a narrative that matched their evidence.
In any event, the article provides one (and only one) concrete example to substantiate its claims to a trend. By their telling, Marine Staff Sgt. Damien Contreras flew from Hawaii to Quantico in late August for a review hearing. The government showed that she effected a gender transition in 2017. However, three witnesses testified to her “decade of flawless service as a supply and logistics specialist,” “three overseas deployments,” and “good performance reviews.”
According to the Times, “after deliberating for about three hours, the board scratched out language on the instructions sheet about evidence of being transgender and voted to let [her] stay.”
Available evidence restricts us to the Times’ own characterization of this specific instance. The military has declined to comment on all individual cases, citing ongoing legislation. But one instance does not make a trend, and the Times cites no other specific instances to bolster its case that review boards are engaging in widespread insubordination.
Examining the Sources
Indeed, a closer look at the evidence may reveal a more complex reality, one which does not match the Times’ tidy narrative that casts Secretary Hegseth as a heartless villain. Unfolding this reality requires a look at the actual documents which precipitated the change.
On February 7, the Pentagon issued a memo freezing the recruitment of any new servicemembers with gender dysphoria. That memo directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel “to provide additional policy and implementation guidance … including guidance regarding service by Service members with a current diagnosis or history of gender dysphoria.”
On February 26, the acting under secretary did issue a memo with “supplementary policy guidance.” That memo establishes as department policy that “Service in the Military Services is open to all persons who can meet the high standards for military service and readiness without special accommodations.” However, “Individuals who have a current diagnosis or history of, or exhibit symptoms consistent with, gender dysphoria are no longer eligible for military service.”
Despite substantial overlap, gender dysphoria is not quite the same thing as a transgender identity. The pro-transgender American Medical Association defined gender dysphoria in 2019 as “a condition characterized by clinically significant distress and impairment of function resulting from the incongruence between one’s gender identity and the sex assigned at birth.”
Obviously, the “sex assigned at birth” language is gratuitous embellishment with no basis in reality. But the core of the definition is the “distress and impairment of function.” Thus, the Pentagon’s reason for excluding people with gender dysphoria from military service is implied in its first point: individuals who “exhibit symptoms consistent with gender dysphoria” need “special accommodations” — including major talk therapy, if not (in the “affirmation” model) cross-sex hormones.
The memo further stipulated the department’s policy to segregate standards and appropriate facilities on the basis of sex, not gender identity.
Critics of the policy likely stopped reading there. But the policy declaring servicemembers with gender dysphoria to be ineligible for service provided exceptions in two later sections, which treated current servicemembers (4.3.c.) and applicants (4.1.c.) in largely the same terms.
Section 4.3.c. stipulated that servicemembers disqualified for a current diagnosis of gender dysphoria, current symptoms of gender dysphoria, or a history of cross-sex hormones or transgender surgery could “be considered for a waiver on a case-by-case basis, provided there is a compelling Government interest in retaining the Service member that directly supports warfighting capabilities.”
For them to receive a waiver, the policy also required servicemembers to demonstrate “36 consecutive months of stability in the Service member’s sex without clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning,” and “that he or she has never attempted to transition to any sex other than their sex,” and to be “willing and able to adhere to all applicable standards, including the standards associated with the Service member’s sex.”
In 53 paragraphs, the Times never once mentioned the existence of these exceptions, nor did it inform its readers whether the review boards who heard appeals considered this highly relevant information. If the review boards considered exceptions, it would provide an explanation for their recommendations to retain certain servicemembers — an explanation far more plausible and less dramatic than rank insubordination.
The Pentagon transgender policy further stipulates that any transgender-identifying servicemembers who were discharged would “be processed for administrative separation in accordance with, and afforded all applicable administrative processing protections in, DoDI 1332.14 and DoDI 1332.30,” the standard procedures for discharging enlisted men and officers, respectively.
To take one instance, DoDI 1332.14 permits servicemembers notified of a “proposed separation” who have at least six years of service “the right to request an administrative board action,” which “will make recommendations on … retention or separation.” The guidance permits review boards to make their recommendation based on factors that include: “The seriousness of the circumstances forming the basis for initiation of separation proceedings,” “The ability of the enlisted Service member to perform duties effectively in the present and in the future,” “The enlisted Service member’s rehabilitative potential,” and “The enlisted Service member’s entire military record.”
“Unless separation is mandatory,” the guidance advises, “the potential for rehabilitation and further useful military service will be considered by the separation authority and, where applicable, the administrative board.”
Conclusion
Given these guidelines, it would be surprising if review boards never recommended the military retain any transgender-identifying servicemembers with clean records. The New York Times tried to twist this into an act of insubordination, when it really comes down to the military boards reading all the rules.
Notably, review boards may only offer recommendations; they do not have the final word (a fact not always reflected in the Times’ reporting). However, if the review board “recommends retention,” the “separation authority” would have to escalate the matter up to “the Secretary of the Military Department concerned with a recommendation for separation based upon the circumstances of the case.”
In one curious line, the Times thought it was advancing its narrative, when in fact it was tearing it apart. “Trans Marines and sailors who went before boards said in interviews that[,] after months of being vilified by top government officials, they expected a quick dismissal, [sic] but instead encountered thoughtful respect from fellow service members who voted to keep them.”
According to the Times, this phenomenon signals broad dissatisfaction — nay, insubordination — against Secretary Hegseth’s transgender policy. It could also signal that the fear was driven by flawed media reporting, and that the transgender policy was always fairer and more humane than its critics alleged. The first possibility satisfies the Left’s reflexive need to find fault in every action the Trump administration takes. The second possibility satisfies Occam’s Razor (the rule of thumb that, given multiple competing theories, the simplest one should be preferred).


